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Financial Reform: Japan Style 
Any financial system is ultimately shaped 
by the economy it serves. Thus, economic 
changes often lead to adaptations in financial 
structure. In the U.S., the growth of money 
market funds, the decline of the thrift indus-
try, and other changes stemming in large 
part from our inflation have graphically 
demonstrated this relation. So it should not 
be surprising, given the exceptionally severe 
worldwide economic shocks of recent years, 
that even more far-reaching transformations 
have been occurring in many financial sys-
tems abroad. 
Virtually every aspect of  Japan's financial 
system has changed dramatically overthe last 
decade. The main forces spurring these 
changes-oil, inflation, prolonged recession, 
fluctuating exchange rates-are similar to 
those causing financial change in the u.s. 
and elsewhere. But the direction Japan's sys-
tem has taken in response has been critically 
shaped by its historical characteristics, caus-
ing changes there to differ in some ways from 
our own. 
Origins 
Traditionally, formal and informal regulation 
of  Japan's financial system has been extra-
ordinarily pervasive by U.S. standards. As 
late as 1970, most key interest rates were 
constrained by government regulation to 
some degree. As in the U.S., deposit interest 
rates were fixed at artificially low levels, and 
allowed to vary only sporadically. The short-
run flexibility of bank lending and most other 
short-term interest rates were severely re-
stricted. Regulation even extended to the 
capital markets, where yields on newly 
issued bonds generally were kept below 
those on the secondary market. 
The activities of financial institutions have 
been regulated no less severely. Until recent-
ly, banks were forbidden to purchase funds 
from the public by issuing certificates of 
deposit or similar instruments (a common 
practice of  banks in the U.s.), to act as dealers 
in the securities markets, and even, in most 
cases, to open new branches. Controls on 
financial flows between Japan and other 
countries have been especially severe, with 
virtually every transaction subject to quotas, 
prior approval, and other forms of scrutiny. 
Foreign banks and other foreign financial 
institutions have been prevented from gain-
ing more than a "toehold" in Japan's markets. 
Not surprisingly, this extensive regulation 
distorted Japan's financial system. Interest 
rate controls led to widespread credit ration-
ing. Money and capital markets remain com-
paratively underdeveloped (only about ten 
percent of funds typically flow through such 
markets in Japan, considerably less than 
here). Regulati'on also largely accounts for the 
historical dearth of consumer credit, and the 
restricted availability of mortgages. Capital 
controls had virtually "walled-off" Japan's 
financial system from those abroad and pre-
vented many Japanese institutions from fully 
using international capital markets. 
Why then have the authorities regulated the 
financial system so heavily? In large part, 
financial regulation attempted to alleviate 
perceived problems in Japan's economy. For 
example, deposit interest rates were held 
down partly to encourage corporate invest-
ment by lowering the cost of bank loans. 
(Whether this policy succeeded is another 
matter.) Capital controls were used partly to 
conserve scarce foreign exchange reserves. 
Japan's authorities have also been more 
willing than officials here to "cushion" 
private institutions against unusually large 
shocks, a policy that often entails some 
control over their activities lest such "free 
insurance" induce them to assume exces-
sively large risks. 
Changing times 
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"solutions," as evidenced by their limited 
moves to increase interest rate flexibility dur-
ing the 1960s. The economic upheavals of 
the next decade drastically accelerated re-
form, though, by fundamentally altering the 
economic basis of regulatory policy. 
In contrast to the U.S., inflation has played a 
comparatively modest role in these changes, 
not least because Japan's authorities have 
been more successfull  in containing inflation. 
More important have been the effects of 
slower real growth and changes in industrial 
structure seen since 1973. 
Slower growth has undermined the tradition-
al basis for monetary policy-corporations' 
heavy dependence on bank loans-by 
lowering business investment demand and, 
hence, its need for external funds. Monetary 
policy now has to rely more heavily on regu-
lating the cost of credit, making more interest 
rate flexibility necessary. Difficulties in fund-
ing recent massive government deficits (in-
curred to spur growth) have underscored 
the advantage of well-developed financial 
markets which Japan lacked. 
By altering traditional financing patterns, 
these factors probably made it considerably 
more difficult for Japan's regulated system to 
allocate savings efficiently. A financial sys-
tem based on rationing relies heavily on 
information available to lenders in allocating 
credit. This reliance works adequately only 
when economic structures, and therefore 
financing needs, have been stable long 
enough for lenders to learn of  them. With 
economic conditions changing rapidly, 
though, lenders' information alone will be 
inadequate to channel savings to their most 
productive uses. 
By contrast, in a free financial system, credit 
flows depend upon the knowledge of both 
lenders and borrowers. Such a system can 
use, or "pool," considerably more informa-
tion than anyone group of participants pos-
sesses, and is therefore essential for efficiency 
in a changing economy. 
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Finally, the breakdown of fixed exchange 
rates among the major currencies has also 
spurred reform, particularly in Japan's finan-
cial relations with other countries. Generally, 
countries have pursued more divergent 
macroeconomic policies under floating ex-
change rate systems, so pressures for capital 
flows have tended to be greater than under 
the fixed rate system. This has probably made 
the task of controlling these flows through 
capital controls more difficult. Moreover, 
controls on capital flows can add to currency 
instability that arises from temporary fluctua-
tions in the balance of payments, and are 
therefore less desirable. For example, a cur-
rency depreciation resulting from a tempo-
rary fall in exports encourages an offsetting 
capital inflow-to take advantage of  the 
appreciation expected when the shortfall 
ends-helping to stabilize the balance of 
payments and the exchange rate. Controls 
would impede such "stabilizing" capital 
flows. Freer capital flows are also needed to 
facilitate Japan's lending to foreigners when 
domestic savings exceed the domestic de-
mand for them, by business and government, 
a frequent condition in recent years. 
...  and reform 
These pressures have led to numerous steps 
toward financial liberalization over the last 
decade aimed at increasing interest rate flex-
ibility, improving the money and capital 
markets, and strengthening links between 
Japan's financial system and those abroad. 
By 1980, virtually all controls on interest rates 
in the call and commercial bills markets in 
Japan had been removed. Money market 
yields were left free to respond to forces of 
supply and demand. In May 1979, banks 
were allowed to issue certificates of deposit 
(with some limitations), a step which has 
since significantly enhanced their funding 
base. Japan's banks were authorized to deal 
in government securities (with some limita-
tions) in last April's major overhaul of the 
country's banking laws, the first major reform 
since World War II. Most radical of all in recent years have been 
reforms affecting financial flows between 
Japan and other countries. In 1979, the short-
term repurchase ("Gensaki") market was 
opened to foreigners, linking Japan's money 
markets with those abroad. In December 
1980, a new foreign exchange law dramati-
cally relaxed many capital controls, reversing 
the old principle of "prohibited where not 
explicitly authorized" to "permitted except 
where explicitly forbidden." These changes 
were followed by the removal of  overt dis-
crimination against foreign banks in Japan 
and by steps making it easier for foreigners 
to borrow in Japan's capital markets. In addi-
tion, the government has actively encour-
aged u.s. finance and insurance companies 
to open offices in Japan, partly in hopes that 
they will spur development of more con-
sumer-oriented financial facilities. 
In sum, financial reform in Japan has been 
much more far-reaching than reform here 
largely because past regulation had made 
Japan's system less adaptable to changing 
economic conditions than our own. Finan-
cial change in Japan has most often been the 
result of government actions; in the U.S., 
change has more often been the work of the 
private sector outside the control of authori-
ties. The reason for this difference is that 
Japan's traditionally heavy regulation pre-
vented spontaneous financial innovation by 
its private sector. In contrast, the much freer 
U.S. system allowed, indeed even encour-
aged, such innovation. 
Where now? 
Japan's style of financial reform has pushed 
its financial system closer to complete liberal-
ization, but the process is yet unfinished. The 
reforms have been limited and future changes 
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will be subject to political and economic 
conflicts familiar to observers of  financial 
reform in the U.S. 
Bank deposit rates remain controlled (al-
though less so than in the past) in part 
because complete deregulation could divert 
funds from the postal savings system-the 
chief source of funds for government lending 
institutions. Official desires to minimize in-
terest costs on government debt may help 
explain why yields on newly issued bonds are 
sti II  restri cted. 
Progress toward "internationalizing" the 
yen -promoting its use by foreigners as well 
as Japanese citizens-illustrates the pressures 
for and resistances to change. Internationali-
zation is an avowed long-term goal of  Japan-
ese authorities, but the authorities have 
to date been unwilling to take one widely 
desired first step toward this goal-the estab-
lishment of an international banking center 
(in Tokyo) free of regulations applied to 
domestic institutions. They continue to fear, 
in part, that it might interfere with domestic 
monetary policy. Historical experience, 
however, strongly suggests that the yen will 
not be used internationally unless Japan's 
financial system becomes substantially freer 
and better developed than at present. 
Japan's progress toward a liberal financial 
system is not complete, but the process 
of reform itself has generated pressures for 
further changes. As U.S. experience demon-
strates, the freer a financial system becomes, 
the harder it becomes to maintain any re-
maining controls. So, although it remains un-
clear where Japan's financial reform will end, 
that it will continue seems almost certain. 
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(Dollar amounts.in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total # 
Individuals, part. & corp. 




































Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves ( +  )/Deficiency (  - ) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves ( +  )/Net borrowed  (  - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
9/22/82  9/15/82 
81  100 
10  142 
71  42 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
10,306  6.8 
11,372  8.7 
6,316  16.1 
3,032  5.6 
366  1.6 
1,217  79.3 
818  14.3 
1,884  - 12.4 
38  0.1 
545  2.0 
1,616  5.5 
14,835  17.4 
13,013  16.8 
4,011  11.8 
Compi'lrable 
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